PHILOSOPHY—WISDOM—THEOLOGY: GERARD OF ABBEVILLE'S *PRINCIPIUM* AND ITS RECEPTION DURING THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY[*]

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IN recent years, the study of the *principia,* that is, inception speeches at the University of Paris by graduating theologians has received increasing attention from historians of both theology and philosophy.[1] The thirteenth-century inception speeches edited thus far usually consist of two parts, first, the *principium in aula,* which was delivered on the inception day itself, and second, the resumption *principium,* with which the masters began their lectures. While the *principia in aula* function as particularly concise introductions to theology and to Holy Scripture, the resumption *principia* focus on the biblical canon and its division.[2] As Thomas Prügl has expressed matters, "the *Principium* offered an opportunity for the new master to map out his understanding of sacred Scripture as theology," a fact which turns this genre into a privileged source "for examining the epistemological status of medieval theology."[3]

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This is particularly true of those *principia* which include references to and discussions of contemporary philosophy in their commendation of theology; thus, with the aim of demonstrating the superiority of their particular discipline, certain theologians offered their own accounts of what they believed to be the philosophical pursuits of their counterparts in the Faculty of Arts. A very prominent example of such a "comparative" type of *principium* is Bonaventure's *De reductione artium ad theologiam* (1254), which has recently been identified as the second part of Bonaventure's inception discourse, that is to say, his *principium resumptum*.[4] Franciscan as well as Dominican, Cistercian, and Benedictine theologians, maintaining a clear distinction between philosophy and theology, established in their *principia* a hierarchy among the two disciplines that enabled them to affirm the preeminence of the latter.[5]

In this context, the *principium* by Gerard of Abbeville, the most prestigious secular theologian at the University of Paris during the third quarter of the thirteenth century, stands out as a significant exception. While Gerard likewise praises theology and strives to demonstrate its preeminence, he follows a different strategy insofar as he avoids pitting theology against philosophy. Instead, and very much in keeping with his

[4] Joshua C. Benson has been able to identify Bonaventure's hitherto unknown *principium in aula,* namely, the sermon *Omnium artifex docuit me sapientia,* as well as to show how this speech was followed, at the resumption, by an early version of the *De reductione*. See Joshua C. Benson, "Identifying the Literary Genre of the *De reductione artium ad theologiam:* Bonaventure's Inaugural Lecture at Paris," *Franciscan Studies* 67 (2009): 149–78, and "Bonaventure's Inaugural Sermon at Paris: *Omnium artifex docuit me sapientia.* Introduction and Text," *Collectanea Franciscana* 82/3–4 (2012): 517–62.

[5] Cf., for instance, the comparative *principia* by Guy de l'Aumône (1256), who was the first Cistercian regent master of theology at the University of Paris; cf. also the *principium* by Galdericus (1258–59), who, for his part, became the first Benedictine regent master; and that of Stephen of Besançon (1286), Master General of the Dominican Order from 1292 to 1294. For these masters and their *principia,* see, respectively, Jacques Guy Bougerol, "Le Commentaire des *Sentences* de Guy de l'Aumône et son 'Introitus,'" *Antonianum* 51/4 (1976): 495–519; Alexander Fidora, "The Inception Speech of Galdericus as an Introduction to Thirteenth-Century Theology and Philosophy," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 87 (2020): 43–58; and idem, "Stephen of Besançon's *principium in aula* (1286): An Epistemological Approach to the Relation between Philosophy and Theology," *Traditio* 76 (2021), in press.

overall thought, which has been studied in depth in a recent monograph by Stephen M. Metzger,[6] Gerard advocates an integrated conception of philosophy and theology, redefining both in terms of wisdom, i.e., sapiential knowledge. In this regard, Gerard's *principium* turns out to be rather different from—or even opposed to—those of his religious fellow theologians who established hard-and-fast lines of division between philosophical and theological knowledge, and in particular between metaphysics and Christian theology, though it is not impossible that Gerard's sapiential approach represents, to some extent, the opinions of the secular masters during the second half of the thirteenth century, a group that still awaits fuller study. In either case, whether a *rara avis* or, on the contrary, the mouthpiece of a larger scholarly community, his *principium* deserves further attention. In what follows, I shall first analyze how Gerard's *principium* describes the philosophical disciplines and theology in relation to wisdom, and I shall then provide evidence for the influence that Gerard's *principium* exercised during the thirteenth century.

GERARD OF ABBEVILLE:
(RE-)NEGOTIATING THE BOUNDARIES OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

Gerard of Abbeville's *principium,* whose two parts have been edited by Metzger, was written during the 1250s.[7] As is customary in the genre, his *principium in aula* builds upon a biblical theme, namely, Proverbs 22:19–20: "Today I will show wisdom to you; behold, I have described her thrice."[8] Accordingly, Gerard starts his inquiry into the nature of theology by explicating the notion of wisdom, which he does by recourse to the authority of Hugh of St. Victor. The latter's *Didascalicon*—which is quoted under the title *De magistro*—is fundamental to Gerard's approach, since it enables him to introduce a distinction between "sapientia divina sive theologica," on the one hand, and "sapientia humana sive

[6] Stephen M. Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville, Secular Master, on Knowledge, Wisdom and Contemplation,* 2 vols. (Leiden and Boston, 2017).

[7] Ibid. 2:449–53 (*principium in aula*) and 454–65 (*principium resumptum*), quoted in this article with spelling modified.

[8] Ibid. 2:449: "Ostendam tibi sapientiam hodie; ecce descripsi eam tripliciter. Proverbiorum XXIIº."

saecularis," on the other.[9] Elaborating upon this distinction, Gerard establishes a hierarchy between the two kinds of wisdom, human and divine; yet he does not argue for the ensuing primacy of divine wisdom on the basis of an epistemological analysis, as did other comparative *principia*. Instead, Gerard emphasizes the perils of the pursuit of human wisdom in terms of the moral pitfalls associated with it, such as deceit and pride. Striving for human wisdom is not objectionable in itself; it is the concomitants of such an enterprise, rather, that pose dangers. Divine wisdom, for its part, is never prone to deceit, nor does it give rise to pride. Interestingly, throughout his *principium in aula,* Gerard consistently speaks of human or secular wisdom, avoiding the expression "philosophical wisdom," whereas for divine wisdom he does, in fact, use the phrase "theological wisdom." This deliberate omission raises the question of Gerard's understanding of philosophy and of its place within his architecture of sapiential knowledge.

Key to answering this question is his *principium resumptum,* which opens with an expanded quotation from Proverbs 22:20–21: "Behold, I have described her to you thrice in thoughts and knowledge to show to

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[9] See ibid.: "Sicut dicit Hugo in libro *De magistro,* duplex est sapientia divina sive theologica et humana sive saecularis. 'Sapientia,' inquit 'quae ad reparandam divinam imaginem intendit, divina est, [et] quae vero infirmitati providet vel exterioribus intendit, humana [est].'" It should be noted that this distinction is only implicit in Hugh's *Didascalicon,* and while Metzger's edition has *Didascalicon* 1.9 listed as the source, Gerard's development of the subject seems more akin to *Didascalicon* 1.8: "Duo vero sunt quae divinam in homine similitudinem reparant, id est, speculatio veritatis et virtutis exercitium. Quia in hoc homo Deo similis est, quod sapiens et iustus est, sed iste mutabiliter, ille immutabiliter et sapiens et iustus est. Illarum vero actionum quae huius vitae necessitati deserviunt, trimodum genus est, primum, quod naturae nutrimentum administrat, secundum, quod contra molesta, quae extrinsecus accidere possunt, munit, tertium, quod contra iam illata praestat remedium. Cum igitur ad reparandam naturam nostram intendimus, divina actio est, cum vero illi quod infirmum in nobis est necessaria providemus, humana. Omnis igitur actio vel divina est vel humana. Possumus autem non incongrue illam, eo quod de superioribus habeatur, intelligentiam appellare, hanc vero, quia de inferioribus habetur, et quasi quodam consilio indiget, scientiam vocare. Si igitur sapientia, ut supra dictum est, cunctas quae ratione fiunt moderatur actiones, consequens est iam ut sapientiam has duas partes continere, id est, intelligentiam et scientiam, dicamus" (Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon de studio legendi* 1.8, ed. Charles Henry Buttimer [Washington, DC, 1939], 15 [spelling modified]).

you [wisdom's] firmness, and so that you may respond with the eloquence of truth."[10] While in the *principium in aula* the verses from Proverbs gave way to a twofold division of wisdom into secular and divine, the *principium resumptum* submits a more nuanced account. Quoting Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 6.1 and Augustine's *De civitate Dei* 11.25, Gerard now claims that there are three kinds of wisdom or science.[11] The content of these three kinds, he adds, is determined by their objects, for which Gerard again quotes two authoritative texts, namely, Hugh of St. Victor's *Didascalicon* and Aristotle's *De anima*. First, Gerard cites Hugh saying that "there are as many wisdoms or sciences as there are kinds of being or of diverse things," which he then ties together with Aristotle's "the sciences are divided up according to [variousness of] their objects."[12] Hence, to account for the division of wisdom or science, Gerard draws the following sketch of an ontology, presented in diagrammatic form in the manuscript:

Ens autem aut est ⟨ operabile a nobis / non operabile a nobis aut ⟨ a natura / praeter naturam[13]

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[10] Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville* 2:454: "Ecce descripsi eam tibi tripliciter in cogitationibus et scientia ut ostenderem tibi firmitatem et eloquia veritatis responderes, 'eam', id est, sapientiam, Proverbiorum XXII°f."

[11] Ibid.; Gerard fails to note that Aristotle's division of speculative or theoretical philosophy within his *Metaphysics* (physics, mathematics, metaphysics) differs from the Platonic-Stoic schema found in *De civitate Dei* (physics, logic, ethics).

[12] Ibid.: ". . . cuius ratio [*scil*. tripartitionis sapientiae] est quia secundum Hugonem *De magistro,* 'tot sunt sapientiae vel scientiae partes quot sunt entium vel rerum diversitates,' et 3° *De anima,* 'sequantur scientiae in res.'" For the quotation from Hugh, see Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon de studio legendi* 1.4 (ed. Buttimer, 11): "Vides iam qua ratione cogimur philosophiam in omnes actus hominum diffundere, ut iam necesse sit tot esse philosophiae partes quot sunt rerum diversitates, ad quas ipsam pertinere constiterit." For the quotation from Aristotle, see *De anima* 3.8 (431b24–25): according to James of Venice's translation (*Aristoteles Latinus* 12.1, ed. J. Decorte and J. Brams): "Secatur igitur scientia et sensus in res" (printed "Secatur autem scientia . . ." in Albertus Magnus, *De anima,* ed. Coloniensis 7.1:223).

[13] Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville* 2:454. This representation is followed by an alternative diagram which confirms the former: "Secundum Anselmum et Hugo-

Accordingly, being is first divided into that which is the result of human endeavor or activity (*operabile a nobis*) and that which is not (*non operabile a nobis*). The first kind of wisdom, therefore, regards being such as it is produced by human endeavor, which being is the object of the mechanical arts (*scientiae mechanicae*), the discursive or speech-related disciplines (*sermocinales*), and practical philosophy (*morales*).[14]

The schema of ontological division that Gerard adopts had, in fact, already been introduced by Dominicus Gundissalinus's *De divisione philosophiae,* which can be considered—along with Hugh's *Didascalicon*—the epistemological *chef d'œuvre* of the twelfth century. In the prologue to this work, one encounters the following classification:

> But of all things that are, some derive from our own endeavor and will—our human endeavors, such as laws, constitutions, practices of divine worship, wars, and similar such things. Other things do not derive from our endeavor or will—things such as God, the angels, heaven, the earth, vegetables, animals, metals, spirits, and all natural matters.
>
> (Sed omnium, quae sunt, alia sunt ex nostro opere et nostra voluntate, ut nostra humana opera sicut leges, constitutiones, Dei cultus exercitia, bella et alia huiusmodi; alia sunt non ex nostro opere nec ex nostra voluntate, ut Deus, angeli, caelum, terra, vegetabilia, animalia, metalla, spiritus et omnia naturalia.)[15]

nem," "ens" is either "voluntarium," "naturale," or "mirabile." As Metzger points out (1:156), this division derives from Anselm of Canterbury (rather than from Hugh of St. Victor). See Anselm of Canterbury, *De conceptu virginali et de originali peccato* 11: "Cum igitur omnia quae fiunt, si diligenter considerentur, fiant aut sola voluntate dei, aut natura secundum vim illi a deo inditam, aut voluntate creaturae; et ea quae nec natura creata nec voluntas creaturae sed solus deus facit, semper miranda sint: apparet quia tres sunt cursus rerum, scilicet mirabilis, naturalis, voluntarius" (ed. F. S. Schmitt, Anselm of Canterbury, *Opera omnia* 2 [Rome, 1940], 154).

[14] See Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville* 2:454–55: "Ens operabile a nobis est de quo scientiae mechanicae, sermocinales, morales. Secundum mechanicas operamur ad conservationem corporis; secundum sermocinales ad conceptionem animi; secundum morales ad totius hominis informationem interioris quoad virtutes adquisitas, manifestationem exterioris quoad mores."

[15] Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De divisione philosophiae—Über die Einteilung der Philosophie,* ed. and German trans. Alexander Fidora and Dorothée Werner

This division, which Gundissalinus inherited from Avicenna's *Logica,* a text translated by himself and Avendauth in Toledo,[16] came to exercise a high degree of influence. The division itself can be found, for instance, in the introductions to philosophy, namely, the brief outlines of philosophy and the parts thereof which thirteenth-century arts masters composed as propaedeutic works for their students. Many of these texts, such as the anonymous *Accessus philosophorum* (1230) or Arnulf of Provence's *Divisio scientiarum* (1250), distinguished between what is and what is not the result of human endeavor, in order to account for the Platonic-Stoic division of philosophy.[17] Consequently, they describe physics as that science concerned with the objects which do not derive from human endeavor, whereas logic and ethics are said to deal with objects that do so derive, namely, the objects of human reason and will, respectively.[18]

Gerard, however, proceeds along different lines, paying only little attention to the objects which derive from human endeavor (*operabile a nobis*). Instead, he focuses his attention upon those objects which do not so derive (*non operabile a nobis*), among which he establishes an additional subdivision between, on the one hand, objects independent of our endeavors that exist within nature's realm (*a natura*), and, on the other, likewise independent objects that exist beyond nature (*praeter naturam*). In this case as well, Gundissalinus's *De divisione philosophiae* seems to have been Gerard's source of inspiration for such a subdivision. Thus,

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(Freiburg i. Br., 2007), 60/62; English translation from Edward Grant, *A Source Book in Medieval Science* (Cambridge, MA, 1974), 60 (here modified).

[16] See Avicenna, *Logica* (Venice, 1508, rpt. Frankfurt a.M., 1961), fol. 2ra; and *Avicenne: Logica (Logique du Šifāʾ),* ed. Françoise Hudry (Paris, 2018), 123–24.

[17] Both texts are edited in Claude Lafleur, *Quatre introductions à la philosophie au XIIIᵉ siècle. Textes critiques et étude historique* (Montréal and Paris, 1988); for the passages in question, see 182 and 321, respectively.

[18] The same division is still present in Aquinas; see Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum,* prol. (ed. Leonina 47.1:4): "Et quia consideratio rationis per habitum scientiae perficitur, secundum hos diversos ordines quos proprie ratio considerat sunt diversae scientiae: nam ad philosophiam naturalem pertinet considerare ordinem rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit, ita quod sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus et mathematicam et metaphysicam; ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis ad invicem et ordinem principiorum in conclusiones; ordo autem actionum voluntariarum pertinet ad considerationem moralis philosophiae."

further exploring the above division of being such as is dependent upon or independent of human endeavor, Gundissalinus eventually arrived at the following conclusion:

> On the basis of these [remarks], then, it is evident that everything which exists either derives from [human] endeavor and will or does not derive from such endeavor, but rather derives from that of God or nature.

> (Ex his igitur manifestum est, quia omne, quod est, aut est ex nostro opere et nostra voluntate aut non est ex nostro opere, sed Dei vel naturae.)[19]

The subdivision of beings independent of human endeavor into those produced by nature and those produced by God is characteristic of Gundissalinus and Gerard; it does not occur in the thirteenth-century introductions to philosophy. While Gerard's classification of beings independent of human endeavor into *a natura* and *praeter naturam* shows a clear reliance upon the passage from the *De divisione philosophiae,* his terminological choices demand consideration, particularly the expression *praeter naturam.* Metzger has suggested that this phrase could be "a literal, if clumsy translation of μετὰ φύσιν,"[20] echoing its common Latin rendering as *post/trans physicam/naturam.*[21] Yet it seems much more plausible that by employing this phrase Gerard was in fact referring to the technical definition of miracles as phenomena "praeter naturam,"[22] a hypothesis which is confirmed by his use of "ens mirabile" as being synonymous therewith.[23]

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[19]   Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De divisione philosophiae,* ed. Fidora and Werner, 62; English trans. Grant, *Source Book in Medieval Science,* 61 (here modified).

[20]   Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville* 1:158.

[21]   See, for instance, Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De divisione philosophiae,* ed. Fidora and Werner, 102, which is based on Avicenna's *Prima philosophia,* translated by Gundissalinus: Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina,* ed. Simone Van Riet, 2 vols. (Louvain and Leiden, 1977–80), 1:24.

[22]   See the *locus classicus* in Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* 2.18.6 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 2 vols. [Grottaferrata, 1971–81], 1:419): "Et illa quidem quae secundum causam seminalem fiunt, dicuntur naturaliter fieri, quia ita cursus naturae hominibus innotuit; alia vero praeter naturam, quorum causae tantum sunt in Deo." For the development of the notion of "praeter naturam" in Aquinas's theology of miracles, see Liam S. O'Bréartúin, "The Theology of Miracles," *Ephemerides Carmeliticae* 20/1 (1961): 3–51.

[23]   See the passage above, n. 13, where Gerard divides being into "ens voluntarium," "ens naturale," and "ens mirabile."

Understanding the semantics at play here turns out to be crucial at the point when Gerard moves from the ontological to the epistemological level. Rather than outlining a Platonic-Stoic division of philosophy, as the contemporary arts masters did, Gerard takes the opportunity to establish a correspondence between the two domains of being that stand independent from human endeavor and the Aristotelian description of theoretical philosophy, and of metaphysics in particular:

> Being which is not related to human endeavor is either being in accordance with nature or being beyond nature. If it is in accordance with nature, it is treated by physics and mathematics. Some beings which are natural or in accordance with nature precede motion, e.g., quantity, because they underlie motion only insofar as they are quantifiable instances, and such beings are separable from motion by means of abstraction; these are treated by mathematics. Some beings, however, follow upon motion and are present in matter by virtue of motion, and these are not separable from motion by means of abstraction; these are treated in physics. Being which is beyond nature is the subject-matter of theology, which treats God and his wonders. Altogether, these sciences are called speculative, because they treat of beings which are the object of speculation or thought.

> (Ens non operabile a nobis dicitur vel a natura aut praeter naturam; a natura de hoc physicae, mathematicae. Ens a natura sive naturale quoddam praecedit motum sicut quantitas, quia non est motum nisi quantum, et tale abstractibile est a motu; de tali ente est mathematica. Quoddam sequitur motum et per motum adquiritur in materia, et istud non est abstractibile a motum; de tali est physica. De ente praeter naturam est theologica, quae est de Deo et eius mirabilibus. Istae dicuntur 'speculativae' quia de ente speculabili vel cogibili.)[24]

This passage clearly chimes with Boethius's treatise *De Trinitate,* in which the three parts of speculative philosophy are described, namely the "pars naturalis," "mathematica," and "theologica,"[25] which, in turn,

[24] Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville,* 2: 455. My translation.

[25] See Boethius, *De Trinitate* 2 (*The Theological Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy,* ed. and trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester [Cambridge, Mass., 1973], 8: "Nam cum tres sint speculativae partes, *naturalis,* in motu inabstracta, ἀνυπεξαίρετος (considerat enim corporum formas cum materia, quae a corporibus actu separari non possunt . . .), *mathematica,* sine motu inabstracta (haec enim formas corporum speculatur sine materia ac per hoc sine motu, quae formae

reflect Aristotle's physics, mathematics, and metaphysics (see *Metaphysics* 6.1). Gerard combines Boethius's outline with the ontological sketch from Gundissalinus, as a result of which physics and mathematics are both said to deal with objects that pertain to the realm of nature. Physics, however, is defined as the science of the natural realm which is related to motion and matter in such a way that it does not allow abstraction from them, whereas mathematics, although its objects are likewise related to motion, has the capacity to consider them independently. Boethius's "theologica," for its part, is described as differing categorically from the other two speculative sciences, since its objects, that is to say, God and his wonders, are beyond nature (*praeter naturam*), and, as this implies, completely unrelated to motion and matter.

According to Metzger's interpretation of *praeter naturam* as a translation of μετὰ φύσιν, one might have expected Gerard to flesh out a genuinely philosophical account of onto-theology in terms of the Aristotelian tradition. This was indeed how many of Gerard's contemporaries understood matters, and is evident most notably in Aquinas's Commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate,* wherein he famously established that metaphysics was a philosophical divine science "secundum modum nostrum," whereas Christian theology was divine science "secundum modum ipsorum divinorum."[26] Gerard, however, proceeds in a different manner. For not only does he define the object of the loftiest of the speculative sciences as God and his wonders, which clearly fits with *praeter naturam*'s signifying a key definition of the Christian theology of miracles, but he also concludes his presentation of the threefold wisdom by directly identifying Boethius's category of "theologica" with Christian theology itself:

cum in materia sint, ab his separari non possunt), *theologica,* sine motu abstracta atque separabilis (nam Dei substantia et materia et motu caret). . . ."

[26] See, in particular, Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boethium De Trinitate* 2.2 (ed. Leonina 50:95 [spelling modified]): "Et secundum hoc de divinis duplex scientia habetur: una secundum modum nostrum, qui sensibilium principia accipit ad notificandum divina, et sic de divinis philosophi scientiam tradiderunt, philosophiam primam scientiam divinam dicentes; alia secundum modum ipsorum divinorum, ut ipsa divina secundum se ipsa capiantur, quae quidem perfecte in statu viae nobis est impossibilis, sed fit nobis in statu viae quaedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem divinam, in quantum per fidem nobis infusam inhaeremus ipsi primae veritati propter se ipsam."

> As a result, the general division of wisdom and science into three parts has become evident, as has the division between sacred science and the remaining sciences, because the latter are concerned with being that derives either from human endeavor or from nature, while the former is concerned with that which lies beyond such endeavor and beyond nature.

> (Sic patet divisio generalis totius sapientiae vel scientiae in tres partes et divisio sacrae scientiae ab aliis scientiis, quia aliae sunt de ente quod est ab opere nostro vel naturae, ista de ente quod est praeter opus nostrum et naturae.)[27]

In summary, the mechanical arts, the discursive disciplines, and practical philosophy constitute the first kind of wisdom; the two speculative disciplines, physics and mathematics, in turn, constitute the second; and the third kind of wisdom is reserved for the supreme part of speculative philosophy, whose objects are *praeter naturam* and which is identified with sacred science or, in other words, Christian theology. From the perspective of his Boethian stance, this identification is possible, and maybe even plausible, for Boethius did not draw a hard-and-fast distinction between Aristotle's onto-theology and Christian theology.[28] Yet in the light of the development of philosophy and theology in the thirteenth century, both doctrinally and institutionally, Gerard's claim turns out to be momentous. As a matter of fact, it undermines the intellectual efforts undertaken by his contemporaries to delimit metaphysics and theology as two distinct sciences—efforts which fueled the discussions of the *principia* mentioned above, which attempt to demonstrate that theology differs from and is superior to philosophy, that is, metaphysics.[29]

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[27] Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville* 2:455. My translation.

[28] See Andreas Speer, "The Vocabulary of Wisdom and the Understanding of Philosophy," in *L'élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge. Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve et Leuven, 12–14 septembre 1998,* ed. Jacqueline Hamesse and Carlos Steel (Louvain, 2000), 257–80.

[29] Guy de l'Aumône's *principium,* for instance, reads like a genuine counter-program to Gerard's: Theology is the loftiest science and the only one that deserves to be called wisdom in absolute terms, since it is an affective science; it must be distinguished from metaphysics, which is the theology of the philosophers that cannot be called wisdom in the same sense, since it is purely speculative; the remainder of the sciences do not deserve to be called wisdom at all: "Ex his patet quod haec scientia [*scil*. theologia] altissima sit, eo quod altissimo modo tradatur et per prin-

For Gerard, Christian theology, which ultimately takes the place of Aristotle's metaphysics in Boethius's division of speculative philosophy, is the loftiest of the three kinds of wisdom that he describes, since it surpasses the wisdom of those disciplines resulting from human endeavor as well as those in the realm of nature which are independent from it. Evidently, when viewed against the background of this threefold division of wisdom in Gerard's *principium resumptum,* the twofold schema of divine and secular wisdom as found in his *principium in aula* cannot be considered to function as a distinction between philosophy and theology—disciplines between which a dividing line would seem difficult, if not impossible, to draw from Gerard's point of view. Rather, Gerard's distinction between secular and divine wisdom cuts across the traditional philosophical corpus, identifying, as he does, the loftiest part of speculative philosophy, that is, metaphysics, with Christian theology and divine wisdom. As the term "philosophy" is consciously avoided in the reconstruction of the various forms of wisdom, and as none of the latter is congruent with the traditional domains of philosophy, little, if any, room remains for an open confrontation between philosophy and theology. As a result, Gerard's *principium* succeeds in establishing the preeminence of theology with regard to all other disciplines without even mentioning philosophy, though the price of such an approach, entirely different from those found in other *principia,* is a vagueness as regards how and where, institutionally speaking, the uppermost part of the speculative sciences should be taught. Was Gerard conceding that the arts masters were entitled to teach (at least parts of) the loftiest of the speculative sciences? If not, was he claiming that to do so should be the prerogative of the theologians?

If we, so to speak, look to the *verso,* and examine the writings of the arts masters themselves, a certain degree of clarification may arise as regards this question. It is undoubtedly true that most thirteenth-century

cipia fidei, quae sunt supra rationem et elevant intellectum ad assentiendum primae veritati propter se, quae se prout vult indicat animis cognituris et ideo propriissime dicitur sapientia . . . , quia perficit animam non solum secundum intellectum, sed etiam secundum affectum. . . . Prima vero philosophia quae est theologia philosophorum et est de causa causarum sed ut perficiens cognitionem secundum viam ratiocinationis et artis, minus proprie dicitur sapientia. Ceterae vero philosophiae quae sunt de causis consequentibus et creatis non debent dici sapientiae sed scientiae" (Bougerol, "Le Commentaire des *Sentences,*" 503 [spelling modified]).

introductions to philosophy contained references to metaphysics as a discipline, thereby confirming that the arts masters considered it a constitutive part of the philosophical curriculum.[30] It is, however, noteworthy that although in their opening remarks almost all the various introductions mention metaphysics or theology as being the third of the speculative disciplines, not all of them include a chapter specifically devoted to it. Such is the case, for instance, with the anonymous *Accessus philosophorum* (1230) and *Philosophica disciplina* (1245), which in their introductions address physics, mathematics, and metaphysics or divine science, the latter of which, however, does not reappear in the remainder of the text.[31] Even a few decades later, in the 1260s, Oliverus Brito still refrained from outlining the contents of metaphysics, arguing that such a science was the particular preserve of God alone.[32] Faced with the surprisingly irregular treatment of metaphysics in these texts, one may surmise that, as a result of the prohibitions issued regarding the reading of Aristotle's books and, in particular, of the *Metaphysics,* certain arts masters still felt uneasy about detailing the contents of the loftiest of the speculative sciences.[33]

Whatever the reasons for these philosophers' caution, there was room for thirteenth-century theologians—both doctrinally and institutionally—to explore more fluid conceptions of the relations pertaining between philosophy and theology. Certain theologians such as Gerard of Abbeville, and later the secular master Henry of Ghent along with the Domini-

[30] See, for instance, the so-called "Guide de l'étudiant" dating from 1230–40, which includes a (relatively short) chapter on metaphysics. See Claude Lafleur (in collaboration with Joanne Carrier), *Le "Guide de l'étudiant" d'un maître anonyme de la Faculté des Arts de Paris au XIIIᵉ siècle* (Québec, 1992), 33–34.

[31] See Lafleur, *Quatre introductions,* 184 (*Accessus philosophorum*) and 261–62 (*Philosophica disciplina*).

[32] See Claude Lafleur (in collaboration with Joanne Carrier), "L'introduction à la philosophie de maître Olivier le Breton," in *L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIᵉ siècle. Autour du "Guide de l'étudiant" du ms. Ripoll 109,* ed. Claude Lafleur (in collaboration with Joanne Carrier) (Turnhout, 1997), 467–87, at 485: "Et 'solus Deus scit hoc senium,' ut dicit Aristoteles in *Veteri metaphysica;* et ob hoc eius divisio dimittatur."

[33] See Alain de Libera, "Structure du corpus scolaire de la métaphysique dans la première moitié du XIIIᵉ siècle," in *L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIᵉ siècle. Autour du 'Guide de l'étudiant' du ms. Ripoll 109,* ed. Claude Lafleur (in collaboration with Joanne Carrier) (Turnhout, 1997), 61–88, at 86–87.

cans Meister Eckhart and Berthold of Moosburg,[34] seized the opportunity, in effect, to (re-)negotiate the boundaries of philosophy and theology.

PETER OF SCALA (?): A CRITIC AND FOLLOWER OF GERARD

In 2002, Andrew Sulavik edited an anonymous *principium* which can possibly be attributed to the Dominican Peter of Scala († 1295).[35] Its first part, the *principium in aula,* adopts Job 28:1 as its theme: "There is a vein for the silver, and a place for gold where they refine it." When explicating this verse, its author underscores the precious qualities of Holy Scripture and theology, namely, the silver of eloquence, the gold of wisdom and the furnace of grace, which refines the precious metals. As Sulavik remarks, this exegesis shows interesting parallels with a sermon by Ranulph of la Houblonnière, a secular theologian from the second half of the thirteenth century.[36]

That the author of the *principium* drew inspiration from his secular fellow theologians is confirmed by his *principium resumptum.* The first paragraph begins with a division of the sciences, which, in turn, is said to flow from the general division of being. The argument runs as follows:

> According to Hugh's *De magistro:* "There are as many wisdoms or sciences as there are kinds of being or varieties of things." And according to the Philosopher, in *De anima* III: "The sciences are divided up according to [variousness of] their objects."

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[34] Andreas Speer has shown how Henry of Ghent, Meister Eckhart, and Berthold of Moosburg went down similar avenues. See Andreas Speer, "Das 'Erwachen der Metaphysik.' Anmerkungen zu einem Paragdigma für das Verständnis des 12. Jahrhunderts," in *Metaphysics in the 12th Century—On the Relationship Among Philosophy, Science and Theology,* ed. Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Alexander Fidora, and Andreas Niederberger (Turnhout, 2004), 17–40, and, by the same author, "*Sapientia nostra*. Zum Verhältnis von philosophischer und theologischer Weisheit in den Pariser Debatten am Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts," in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte,* ed. Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, Jr., and Andreas Speer (Berlin, 2001), 248–75.

[35] Andrew (Athanasius) Sulavik, "An Unedited *Principium Biblicum* Attributed to Petrus de Scala, O.P.," *Angelicum* 79 (2002): 87–126, edition at 105–26, quoted in this article with spelling modified.

[36] Ibid., 91.

(Secundum Hugonem, *De magistro:* "Tot sapientiae vel scientiae partes quot sunt entium vel rerum diversitates." Et secundum Philosophum, III° *De anima:* "Scientiae secantur in res.")[37]

The combination of Hugh of St. Victor and Aristotle at this point in the text is not fortuitous but, rather, betrays Gerard's *principium* as its source, even more so since the anonymous author here refers to Hugh's *Didascalicon* under the title *De magistro,* i.e., the same title used by Gerard. In those parts of the *principium* which are not reliant upon Gerard, in contrast, he calls the work *De origine artium,* as was common procedure for the reason that the title of its first book appears in just such a form.[38]

That the anonymous author was using Gerard's text is also evident from the division of the biblical books which, in both of their *principia,* follows upon the division of the sciences. Thus, paragraphs 7 to 46 of Sulavik's edition of the *principium resumptum* are taken from Gerard's text, with very few additions. In order to illustrate this reliance, the following table collates the opening lines of paragraphs 7 to 11 of Sulavik's edition alongside the corresponding text in Gerard's *principium:*

Peter of Scala (?), *Principium: Divisio Sacrae Scripturae* (ed. Sulavik, 115–16)	Gerard of Abbeville, *Principium resumptum* (ed. Metzger, 2:457–58)
7. Vetus igitur testamentum, cum sit de figuris et signis in quibus Christus significatur, dividitur in tres. . . .	Vetus ergo testamentum, cum sit de figuris et signis in quibus Christus figurabatur, dividitur in tres partes (457.23–24). . . .
8. Ista divisio veteris testamenti in tres partes, scilicet legem, prophetas et psalmos, et praefiguratio Christi in eis tangitur Lucae ultimo. . . .	Ista divisio veteris testamenti in tres partes, scilicet legem, prophetias, psalmos, et praefiguratio Christi in eis tangitur in Lucae ultimo (458.10–11). . . .

[37] Ibid., 112. My translation.

[38] For the title "De origine artium," see Jerome Taylor's introduction to Hugh of St. Victor, *The Didascalicon,* trans. Jerome Taylor (New York/London, 1961), 7–8.

9. Et nota quod lex, ut hic sumitur, continet quinque libros Moysi....	Et nota quod lex ut hic sumitur continet ᴠ libros Moysi (458.16–17)....
10. Et nota quod lex sumitur multis modis. Aliquando enim sumitur pro toto veteri testamento....	Lex enim sumitur multis modis. Aliquando sumitur pro toto veteri testamento (458.23–24)....
11. Doctrina mandatorum, id est lex Moysi, proprie dicta dividitur in tres partes. Scilicet in prooemium vel prologum, tractatum et epilogum, sicut dividitur *Liber praedicamentorum* in antepraedicamenta, praedicamenta, postpraedicamenta....	(One of the anonymous author's very few additions: not in Gerard)

The fidelity with which the anonymous author reproduces Gerard's text in these and the remaining paragraphs, which comprise eleven pages in Sulavik's edition of the anonymous *principium* and nine in Metzger's edition of Gerard's text, is extraordinary. Except for very few additions, such as paragraph 11, paragraphs 7 to 46 coincide almost verbatim with Gerard's texts. This is all the more remarkable since the anonymous author wrote at a time when Gerard was considered to be the foremost opponent among the secular theologians engaged in conflict with the mendicants at the University of Paris.[39]

The anonymous author's paragraphs 1 to 4 outlining the division of the sciences, in contrast, present a very different picture. He initially follows Gerard in his division of the foregoing sciences; as his argument proceeds, however, he introduces a series of systematic changes into the latter's account. Thus, after quoting Hugh and Aristotle, he starts by recalling the fundamental division of the objects and sciences pertaining to and independent from human endeavor:

> Certain things do not derive from human endeavor, and these constitute the object of the speculative sciences. Other things indeed derive from such, and either pertain to the perfection of the soul, in which case they constitute the object of the practical sciences, or they pertain to the perfec-

[39] On Gerard's attack on the mendicants, see, among others, Tiziana Suarez-Nani, "Gerhard von Abbeville," in *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie 4/1: Die Philosophie des Mittelalters,* ed. Alexander Brungs, Vilem Mudroch, and Peter Schulthess (Basel, 2017), 471–75, with the relevant references.

tion of the body, in which case they fall under the mechanical arts. Signs, however, are the concern of logic, that is to say, of rational science.

(Rerum autem quaedam sunt non ex opere nostro, de quibus speculativa. Quaedam sunt ex opere nostro: aut ergo pertinent ad perfectionem animae, de quibus practica, aut ad perfectionem corporis, de quibus mechanica. De signis vero est logica, id est rationalis scientia.)[40]

The above is still fairly much in keeping with Gerard's division, even though the discursive disciplines are established as a category in their own right, following Augustine's famous distinction of *res* and *signa*. Likewise, the ensuing presentation of the mechanical arts, of the discursive disciplines, and of practical philosophy remains very close to Gerard's text. With regard to the mechanical arts, for instance, the anonymous author reproduces Gerard's account verbatim:

Peter of Scala (?), *Principium: Divisio Sacrae Scripturae* (ed. Sulavik, 113)	Gerard of Abbeville, *Principium resumptum* (ed. Metzger, 2:455)
Dicuntur autem mechanicae, id est adulterinae, vel quia faciendo opus simile operi naturae non faciunt opus verum, sed adulterinum, sicut ars fusoria non facit verum hominem, sed eius similitudinem; vel quia pertinent ad ministrum quoad actionem, licet ad sapientem sive philosophum quoad rationem.	Dicuntur autem mechanicae, id est adulterinae, vel quia faciendo opus simile operi naturae non faciunt opus verum sed adulterum, sicut ars fusoria non facit verum hominem sed eius similitudinem, vel quia pertinent ad rusticum quoad actionem licet ad sapientem sive philosophum quoad rationem.

As far as the discursive and the practical disciplines are concerned, Gerard's account is very brief, in that it only mentions them as parts of those disciplines which involve human endeavor. Here, the anonymous author adds a few lines, offering the standard division of the discursive disciplines into grammar, logic, and rhetoric, and that of practical philosophy into ethics, economics, and politics.

What differs considerably in this account is the presentation of speculative philosophy. Deliberately omitting Gerard's interpretation of Gundissalinus's subdivision pertaining to being that is independent of human

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[40] Sulavik, "Unedited *Principium Biblicum*," 112. My translation.

endeavor, namely, the distinction between being *a natura* and being *praeter naturam,* the anonymous author turns directly to the Aristotelian division of theoretical philosophy into three parts, a "pars naturalis," a "pars mathematica," and a "pars theologica vel metaphysica."[41] As we have seen in the case of Gerard, these are described by recourse to Boethius's explanations as found in his *De Trinitate,* which the anonymous author quotes explicitly, discussing the various objects of these sciences in terms of their relation to motion and matter. Significantly, from the very outset he avoids the ambiguity of the Boethian notion of "theology," glossing "theologica" as "metaphysica." Consequently, at the end of his discussion of the speculative sciences, he does not position sacred science at the summit of the speculative sciences, as Gerard had done. On the contrary, and in clear response to Gerard, he draws the following conclusion:

> It should be known that according to Hugh's *De origine artium* theology is twofold: one is mundane, the other ecclesiastical. The theology which is contained in the books of the *Old* and *New Metaphysics* is the first part of philosophy and hence is called first philosophy. For it arises from human reason and treats of God solely as regards being in general; it is, therefore, the science of truth, rather than of piety; it is purely speculative, rather than practical. Ecclesiastical theology treats of God in terms of the supreme beatifying good, because such theology stirs our appetite towards the good; the Apostle in 1 Tim. 6:3 calls this the science of piety.

> (Sed sciendum quod secundum Hugonem, *De origine artium,* duplex est theologia: una mundana, alia ecclesiastica. Theologia, quae continetur in libris *Veteris* et *Novae metaphysicae,* haec est prima pars philosophiae, unde et prima philosophia vocatur. Habet enim ortum a humana ratione, et est de Deo in ratione generalis entis: unde est scientia veritatis, non pietatis; pure speculativa, non practica. Theologia ecclesiastica est de Deo in ratione summi boni beatificantis, quia in bonum movet appetitum, et appellatur ab Apostolo scientia pietatis, I Thi. VI,3.)[42]

Targeting Gerard, who relies heavily on Hugh of St. Victor for his division of the sciences, the anonymous author recalls that already in the latter's work, namely, in his *Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy,*

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[41] Ibid., 113: "Speculativa similiter dividitur in tres partes, scilicet naturalem, mathematicam, theologicam seu metaphysicam."

[42] Ibid., 113–14. My translation.

one meets with a distinction between revealed and philosophical theology.[43] He accordingly advocates a strict separation between metaphysics, on the one hand, as the uppermost branch of the speculative disciplines, and Christian theology, on the other, the latter of which he terms a pious—or, as Albert the Great puts it, an affective—science, in contrast to those of a speculative nature.[44] Wisdom plays no part in this critical response to Gerard's approach; instead, philosophy—a term Gerard pretty consistently avoids—is used to describe onto-theology, which is called—as likewise occurs in the Aristotelian tradition—first philosophy.

All in all, the *principium* whose author might have been Peter of Scala is unable to conceal its indebtedness to Gerard of Abbeville, and particularly to his division of the biblical canon, which it largely replicates. This notwithstanding, from a more systematic point of view, the author launches a forceful response to Gerard's sapiential approach, contributing his share to the ongoing discussion concerning the nature of metaphysics and theology.

NICHOLAS OF GORRAN: GERARD AND AQUINAS INTO ONE

In the introduction to his edition of the *principium* tentatively attributed to Peter of Scala, Sulavik has made comparisons between the text and certain other works. In particular, he has noted important parallels between the *principium resumptum* and a text by the famous Dominican preacher and exegete Nicholas of Gorran (†1295). Sulavik, in fact, has been able to show not only that Nicholas's *Introitus in totam bibliam* contains large excerpts drawn from Thomas Aquinas's *principium Hic*

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[43] See Hugh of St. Victor, *Commentarii in Hierarchiam coelestem S. Dionysii Areopagitae,* PL 175:923–1154, at 926. The anonymous author erroneously refers to this work as *De origine artium,* which is the title he uses for Hugh's *Didascalicon*. On Hugh's distinction of "theologia mundana" and "theologia divina," see Filipe Silva, "Teologia e teoria das ciências em Hugo de S. Victor," *Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos* 21 (2002): 21–36.

[44] In this regard, the anonymous author's notion of theology reveals the influence of Albert the Great. For the latter's theology, see Henryk Anzulewicz, "The Systematic Theology of Albert the Great," in *A Companion to Albert the Great. Philosophy, Theology, and the Sciences,* ed. Irven M. Resnick (Leiden and Boston, 2013), 16–67.

est liber (1256),[45] but also that certain passages therein coincide with the anonymous author's *principium resumptum.* It would have seemed natural to assume, therefore, that Nicholas drew inspiration from his fellow Dominican Thomas Aquinas and the anonymous author, possibly also a Dominican.[46]

This assumption needs to be modified in light of the relationship of the anonymous *principium* to Gerard of Abbeville's *principium,* since Nicholas's alleged quotations from the former coincide themselves with that work's quotations from Gerard. Both the anonymous author and Nicholas, therefore, include within their works the complete division of the biblical canon just as it appears in Gerard's text. Notably, however, Nicholas does not include in his text the anonymous author's very few additions to Gerard's division of that canon, e.g., paragraph 11 (see p. 198 above).[47] This is already a strong argument in favor of Gerard's direct influence upon Nicholas.

Differences in the manner that the texts are structured within the three works, moreover, corroborate the unmistakable connection between Gerard's and Nicholas's *principia*. The following table compares the textual structure of a particular passage occurring in all three authors, a comparison which shows the different ways in which the anonymous author and Nicholas handled Gerard's texts:

Nicholas's *Introitus*[48]	Peter of Scala (?)	Gerard of Abbeville
Epistolae vero canonicae quae informant ecclesiam tempore adversitatis dividuntur sic:	39. Epistolae canonicae quae informant ecclesiam tempore adversitatis sic dividuntur:	Epistolae canonicae, quae informant ecclesia tempore adversitatis, sic dividuntur.

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[45] See the recent edition in Michael Estler, *"Rigans montes" (Ps 104,13). Die Antrittsvorlesung des Thomas von Aquin in Paris 1256* (Stuttgart, 2015).

[46] See Sulavik, "Unedited *Principium Biblicum,*" 94–96 and 100, and "*Principia* and *introitus,*" 274.

[47] An echo of paragraph 11, along with other excerpts from the anonymous *principium resumptum,* appears in another text, that is, the *Lectura ordinaria super sacram scripturam Henrico de Gandavo adscripta;* see Sulavik, "Unedited *Principium Biblicum,*" 89. The parallel passages are rather general, however, which makes it hard to assess the precise relation between these texts.

[48] Andrew Sulavik has kindly shared with me his preliminary edition of Nicholas's *Introitus,* from which I have drawn the various quotations.

quia vel adversarii persequuntur in fidelibus

quatuor enim erant quae adversarii fidei in fidelibus persequebantur, scilicet constantiam fidei quoad Deum, oboedientiam quoad praelatum, concordiam quoad proximum, perseverantia in bono quoad seipsum.

40. Primo persequebantur constantiam fidei quoad Deum, et ideo intentio Iacobi in sua epistola est animare fideles ad constantiam fidei contra adversitates, unde Iacobi Iᵒ,1: "Omne gaudium existimate' etc. Et Vᵒ,10: Exemplum accipite, longanimitates, et patientiae, prophetas" etc.

Adversarii in fidelibus quatuor persequebantur, scilicet

constantiam fidei quoad Deum, et sic informantur fideles in epistola Iacobi;

constantiam fidei quoad Deum; ideo Iacobi est animare fideles ad constantiam fidei contra adversitates,

unde Iacobi Iᵒ, "omne gaudium existimate," etc., et Vᵒ, 'exemplum accipite longanimitatis et patientiae prophetias,' etc.;

vel persequuntur oboedientiam quoad praelatum, et sic informantur ad oboedientiam in canonicis Petri;

41. Secundo persequebantur oboedientiam quoad praelatos, ideo intentio Petri in suis epistolis fuit hortari ad oboedientiam, unde prima Petri IIᵒ,18: "Servi, subditi estote in omni timore dominis." Et IIIᵒ,18: "Mulieres subditae sint viris suis" etc.

oboedientiam quoad praelatum, ideo intentio Petri est hortari oboedientiam,

Iᵉ Petri IIᵒ "servi subditi estote in omni timore dominis vestris," et IIIᵒ, "mulieres subditae sint viris suis";

vel persequuntur caritatem et concordiam quoad proximum, et sic hortatur ad caritatem in canonicis Iohannis; vel

42. Tertio persequebantur caritatem et concordiam quoad proximum, ideo intentio beati Iohannis in suis epistolis

caritatem et concordiam quoad proximum, ideo intentio Iohannis per totum est hortari ad caritatem, ut patet de

persequuntur perseve- | per totum est hortari ad | se; perseverantiam in
rantiam in bono quoad | caritatem, ut patet de se. | bono quoad se ipsum,
seipsum, et sic in cano- | | ideo intentio Iudae est
nicae Iudae. | 43. Quarto perseque- | informare fideles in

43. Quarto perseque-
bantur perseverantiam
in bono quoad seipsum,
ideo Iudae intentio est
informare fideles in per-
severantia per hoc quod
eos revocat ab imitatio
pseudo, unde dicit:
"Subintroierunt quidam
impii, Dei gratiam in
luxuriam transferentes"
(ed. Sulavik, "Unedited
Principium Biblicum,"
125 [spelling modified])

per totum est hortari ad
caritatem, ut patet de se.

se; perseverantiam in
bono quoad se ipsum,
ideo intentio Iudae est
informare fideles in
perseverantia per hoc
quod eos revocat ab
imitatione pseudo, unde
dicit 'subintroierunt
quidam impii Dei
gratiam in luxuriam
transferentes" (ed.
Metzger, *Gerard of
Abbeville* 2:463.29–
464.6 [spelling modi-
fied]).

This passage explains how the Canonical Epistles prepare the faithful to combat the enemies of the Church by exhorting the former to preserve their "constantia fidei," their "oboedientia," their "concordia," and their "perseverantia." In Gerard's *principium,* the argument is difficult to follow, as he explicates the four items along with their respective biblical proof-texts, thus producing a lengthy and complex sentence. The author of the *principium* attributed to Peter of Scala clearly wished to enhance the structure of the argument by altering the way the text is set out. Instead of adducing the list of items along with their proof-texts, he begins with a brief presentation of the four items alone, and only then does he turn to a discussion of them each by means of the relevant proof-texts. The resulting structure is far more transparent than Gerard's original. While Nicholas's account tends towards considerable abbreviation, it nevertheless follows Gerard's denser structure insofar as it juxtaposes the four items along with their respective biblical references. These and other positive coincidences between Nicholas and Gerard, together with the absence in Nicholas's text of the anonymous author's insertions, make it safe to conclude that Nicholas was directly reliant upon Gerard.

Consequently, Nicholas's *Introitus* is made up entirely of excerpts from Aquinas's *Hic est liber* and Gerard's *principium,* combining two authors who represented polar opposites not only in terms of their views regarding metaphysics and theology, but even more so in terms of the

conflict prevailing between secular and mendicant theologians.[49] Significantly, Nicholas omits Gerard's division of the sciences, in all likelihood because he was writing an *Introitus,* that is, an introduction to the Bible, and not a (comparative) inception speech. But Nicholas may have also ignored Gerard's ideas on theology and metaphysics for strictly systematic reasons. At any rate, it is remarkable that, in spite of the outspoken opposition between Aquinas and Gerard, Nicholas had recourse to both of their texts alongside each other.[50]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The foregoing analysis has shown that Gerard of Abbeville's *principium* is highly original when set alongside other comparative inception speeches. Its manner of conceiving the relations between philosophy and theology, and more specifically between metaphysics and Christian theology, leads to a completely different account of the latter's preeminence, one which aims to accommodate the traditional body of metaphysical knowledge within the framework of theological wisdom, rather than drawing an impassable boundary-line between philosophical and theological approaches. Of course, this concept must have elicited controversial reactions, not only from the philosophers who claimed metaphysics as part of their curriculum, but also among theologians, as the case of the *principium* attributed to Peter of Scala reveals. It must be noted, however, that there were theologians who developed similar trains of thought to that of Gerard; likewise, among contemporary arts masters, the place of metaphysics was not always so neatly defined. Gerard's *principium* can therefore provide a key to our understanding of the ways in which thirteenth-century philosophers and theologians strove to deter-

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[49] In fact, Aquinas replied to Gerard's criticism of the mendicants in his *De perfectione vitae spiritualis* and *Contra doctrinam retrahentium;* see Suarez-Nani, "Gerhard von Abbeville," 474.

[50] Such is how they would likewise appear in William of Nangis's *Chronicon* (1300), side by side as two of the most distinguished theologians of their day; quoted in Metzger, *Gerard of Abbeville* 1:14 n. 2: "Florebant hoc tempore Parisius insignes theologi, frater Thomas de Aquino ordinis Praedicatorum, et frater Bonaventura ordinis Minorum, atque de saecularibus clericis magister Guerodus de Abbatis villa et magister Robertus de Sorbona, qui scholares primus constituit Sorbonenses."

mine the scope of their discipline. While Gerard's approach would not ultimately prevail, the influence of his *principium* must have been widespread, as is evidenced by the anonymous author (Peter of Scala?) and Nicholas of Gorran, who, though in strong disagreement with some of Gerard's tenets, continued to copy his text.

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